Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 8 | Issue 2

Article 1

1991

A Comprehensive Review of Private Sector Drug
Testing Law
Jeffrey J. Olsen

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Olsen, Jeffrey J. (1991) "A Comprehensive Review of Private Sector Drug Testing Law," Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal:
Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/1

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Olsen: A Comprehensive Review of Private Sector Drug Testing Law

HOFSTRA LABOR LAW JOURNAL
Volume 8, No. 2

Spring 1991

ARTICLES

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF
PRIVATE SECTOR DRUG
TESTING LAW
Jeffrey J. Olsen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Drug and alcohol abuse has replaced AIDS as the top workplace concern according to a recent survey among industrial relations executives.' Substance abuse reportedly costs employers close
* Jeffrey J. Olsen is an attorney with the National Labor and Employment Law Firm of
Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman. Mr. Olsen is a member of the New York State Bar
and is a graduate of the State University of New York at Binghamton and Hofstra University
School of Law.
Mr. Olsen has prepared numerous drug-free workplace policies and programs for employers and has spoken before various business groups on the legal issues surrounding substance
abuse in the workplace.
The author wishes to thank the many members of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and
Krupman who contributed to the article. Special thanks to Michael J. Soltis and Roger P.
Gilson, partners with Jackson, Lewis, for their editorial assistance.
1. See Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1989, at 1, col. 5. The survey of 257 industrial labor executives was done by Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, a national labor law firm represent-
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to $100 billion annually due to lost productivity, increased absenteeism, and drug related injuries. A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics
survey of private sector employers in a variety of industries who
tested their employees and applicants for drugs showed some frightening results: of the 950,000 current employees tested, about 9 %
tested positive; of the nearly 3.9 million job applicants tested, 12%
had positive test results.'
Due to the high incidence of drug and alcohol abuse within the
American workplace, the federal government has set in motion a variety of laws and regulations designed to prevent, detect and eliminate illegal drug use in the workplace. 4 The Drug-Free Workplace
Act (hereinafter "DFWA"), 5 which became effective March 18,
1989, requires federal contractors and recipients of federal funds to
establish drug-free workplace programs.8 Although the DFWA does
not specifically require employers to test employees and applicants
for drugs, several government agencies, including the Departments
of Transportation and Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have developed regulations that require employers to establish and administer drug-free workforce policies and programs that
include the testing of employees and job applicants. 7
The use and abuse of drugs and alcohol is a significant legal,
economic and social problem affecting today's workplace. As a result, many employers have implemented substance abuse testing programs, whether or not required to do so by the federal government.'
In many instances these testing programs have paid off. According
to a cost benefit analysis reported in the Bureau of National Affairs
Daily Labor Reporter, the immediate discharge and replacement of
198 employees who failed "for-cause" drug tests between 1983 and
1987 saved the Georgia Power Company between $294,000.00 and
ing management.
2.

The Bureau of National Affairs, Alcohol and Drugs In The Workplace: Costs, Con-

trols, and Controversies 7, 8 (1986).
3. The National Report on Substance Abuse, January 18, 1989, at 4-5.
4. See Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5151, 102 Stat. 4304
(1988) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988)); 48 C.F.R. § 252.223-7500 (1989); 10
C.F.R. § 26 (1990).
5. 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1988).

6. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-702 (1988).
7.

See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.

8. More than eighty percent of manufacturing firms in a variety of high-technology industries have corporate drug and alcohol policies, with 93 percent of the firms testing applicants for drugs and approximately 75 percent testing current employees. See Economic Report, The Drug-Free Workplace, February 1990.
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$1.7 million.9 Savings totaled about $15,000.00 per discharged
worker."°

However, as more employers seek to control substance abuse in
their workplaces through drug and alcohol testing programs, a growing number of lawsuits based on a myriad of legal theories have been
brought by job applicants and employees resentful of the testing process."' Employers who desire a drug testing program are now guided
by a patchwork of rules from all levels of government (local, state,
and federal) as well as numerous, often inconsistent court rulings.
Given the lack of coordination between the federal laws requiring
substance abuse programs, the inconsistent state and local laws restricting drug testing, and the many court decisions establishing conflicting standards for workplace drug testing, employers are confused
as to what they can and can not do in implementing a drug testing
program.
This Article will address some of the legal and practical considerations facing private sector employers who wish to establish a substance abuse program. Specifically, this Article will outline the requirements under the new federal laws which obligate private
employers to develop substance abuse programs, and the various legal restrictions on substance abuse testing imposed by the courts and
by federal, state and local legislation. Against this backdrop of legal
considerations, this Article will offer some practical suggestions for
developing and implementing an effective substance abuse program.
II.

FEDERAL DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE LEGISLATION AND
REGULATIONS

The federal government has taken several bold initiatives in
fighting the use and abuse of drugs in the workplace through various
legislative and regulatory efforts. With respect to drug testing, the
government's focus thus far has been on safety-sensitive positions
within safety-sensitive industries (i.e., transportation, defense, and
9. The National Report on Substance Abuse, October 11, 1989, at 2-3.
10. Id.
11. See Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988); Rushton
v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 218
Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. App. Dist. 1990); Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d
1087, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1990); Fowler v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 537 So. 2d 162 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1989); National Gypsum Co. v. State Employment
Sec. Bd. of Review, 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1989); Doe v. Roe, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d
365 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990); Glide Lumber Prod. Co. v. Employment Div., 86 Or. App. 669, 741
P.2d 907 (Or. App. 1987).
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nuclear power). 12 The Drug-Free Workplace Act applies to both
safety-sensitive and non-safety-sensitive positions, but it does not require drug testing. 13 Below is a summary of each of the federal laws
and regulations requiring the establishment of substance abuse programs in the workplace.
A.

The Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988

1. Applicability.-The Drug-Free Workplace Act, or DFWA,
became effective March 18, 1989, and applies to (1) federal contractors with individual procurement contracts of $25,000 or more; and
(2) any direct recipient of federal grants, regardless of the dollar
amount of the grant. 4 The Office of Management and Budget's Interim Guidelines for implementing the Drug-Free Workplace Act
confirm that subcontractors and recipients of indirect grants, such as
third party reimbursements, are not subject to the DFWA.' 5
2. CertificationRequirements.-The DFWA requires covered
employers to certify to the contracting or granting agency that it will
provide a drug-free workplace by:
(A) publishing a statement notifying employees that the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, possession or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the person's workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken against employees for violations
of such prohibition;
(B) establishing a drug-free awareness program to inform employees about (i) the dangers of drug abuse in the workplace; (ii) the
person's policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace; (iii) any
available drug counseling, rehabilitation and employee assistance
programs; and (iv) the penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations;
(C) making it a requirement that each employee to be engaged in
the performance of [the federal contract or grant] be given a copy
of the statement ...
(D) notifying each employee in the statement. . . that as a condition of employment under such contract [or grant], the employee
will (i) abide by the terms of the statement; and (ii) notify the
employer of any criminal drug statute conviction for a violation occurring in the workplace no later than 5 days after such conviction;
12. See 10 C.F.R. § 26.1-26.24 (1990); 48 C.F.R. § 252.223-7500 (1989); 49 C.F.R. §
391.93-391.121 (1989).
13. See 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1988).
14. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988).
15. See Governmental Implementation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 54
Fed. Reg. 4946 (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 21679 (1990).
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(E) notifying the contracting [or granting] agency within 10 days
after receiving notice [of a workplace drug conviction] from an employee or otherwise receiving actual notice of such conviction...
(F) imposing a sanction on, or requiring the satisfactory participation in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program by, any
employee who is so convicted [within 30 days after receiving notice
from an employee of such conviction]; and
(G) making a good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug-free
workplace by complying with the requirements of [the law]. 1
Many drug-free workplace advocates have criticized the DFWA
for its limited impact upon deterring substance abuse in the workplace. The Drug-Free Workplace DFWA does not require drug testing, does not require searches of employees suspected of substance
abuse, does not prohibit alcohol in the workplace, and does not require the establishment of an EAP. 17 In fact, the DFWA does not
require any sanctions unless an employee is actually convicted for
8
violating a criminal drug statute in the workplace." Perhaps most
significant, the DFWA does not expressly prohibit reporting to work
"under the influence" of drugs or alcohol. Thus, an employee may
"beat the system" under the Drug Free Workplace Act by "getting
high" prior to work or during lunch breaks.
3. Grounds For Contract Suspension, Termination or Debarment.-If a contracting employer fails to meet the requirements of
the Act, the federal government may suspend contract payments,
terminate the contract or even debar the contractor from federal
19
government work for a period of up to five (5) years.
The Department of Defense's Interim Drug-Free Workforce
Rule

B.

1. Applicability.-The Department of Defense's Interim
20
Drug-Free Workforce rule applies only to defense contractors.
There are two categories of defense contracts subject to the requirements of the rule: "(a) all contracts involving access to classified information; [and] (b) any other contract [under which] the contracting officer determines that inclusion of [a drug-free workforce]
clause is necessary for reasons of national security, [or protection of
the] health or safety of those using or affected by the product of or
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(A)-(a)(1)(G)(1988).
See 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1988).
See 54 Fed. Reg. 4949 (1989).
See 41 U.S.C. §§ 701(b) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 702(b) (1988).
See 48 C.F.R. § 223.7501 (1989).
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performance of the
contract (except for commercial or commercial2
type products)." 1
2. Contract Clause Requirements.-Each contract with the
Defense Department subject to the requirements of the rule must
contain a clause in which the contractor agrees to institute a drugfree workplace program.22
This program must provide for:
(1) [e]mployee assistance programs emphasizing high level direction, education, counseling, rehabilitation, and coordination with
available community resources;
(2) [s]upervisory training to assist in identifying and addressing illegal drug use by Contractor employees;
(3) self-referrals as well as supervisory referrals to treatment
[for substance abuse;] . . . and

(4) [the means for] identifying illegal drug users, including
testing ....23
3. Drug Testing Requirements.-Drugtesting programs under
the DOD regulations are mandated for employees in safety-sensitive
positions. 24 Although the rule does not specifically state that random
testing is required, "Questions and Answers" published by the Defense Department indicate that employees in safety sensitive positions must be tested on a random basis.25 The extent and criteria of
the random testing is the responsibility of the contractor.26 The rule
also authorizes (but does not require) drug testing where there is
reasonable suspicion of employee drug use, where the employee has
been involved in an accident or an unsafe practice, as a follow-up to
counseling or rehabilitation programs, or on a voluntary basis.2 7
Contractors must adopt "appropriate personnel procedures" to
deal with employees who test positive. 28 Generally, no employee discovered to be using drugs illegally on the job may remain on duty or
continue performing contract work until the contractor determines
that the worker is fit for duty. 29 The Defense Department has yet to
establish specific guidelines or procedures for implementing its
program.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See 48 C.F.R.
See 48 C.F.R.
See 48 C.F.R.
See 48 C.F.R.
Department of
Id. at 2.
See 48 C.F.R.
See 48 C.F.R.
Id.

§ 223.7504(a)-(b) (1989).
§ 252.223-7500(e) (1989).
§ 252.223-7500(c)(1)-(c)(4) (1989).
§ 252.223-7500 (c)(4)(i) (1989).
Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Questions and Answers.
§ 252.223-7500 (c)(4)(ii)(A)-(D) (1989).
§ 252.223-7500(d) (1989).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/1

6

Olsen: A Comprehensive Review of Private Sector Drug Testing Law
1991]

Drug Testing Law

C.
1.

The Department Of Transportation'sDrug Testing
Regulations
Overview.-The Department of Transportation (hereinafter

"DOT") issued an interim final rule effective December 21, 1988,
calling for anti-drug programs to be conducted by employers regu-

lated by the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, United States Coast
Guard, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, and Research

and Special Programs Administration." Under the new rules, public
and private employers in the transportation industry will be required

to test individuals in safety sensitive positions for certain controlled
substances.31
2. Drug Testing Requirements.-Employees covered under

these regulations will be subject to random drug tests, as well as to
tests in pre-employment job applications, routine physicals, upon
reasonable suspicion of use, and after an accident.32 The tests will
check for the presence of controlled substances including marijuana,

cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and PCP."3 Employees who test positive for drugs must be removed from their duties and can only be

reinstated after testing negative and with the approval of a medical
officer.3 4 Prior to testing, employers must develop, implement, and

maintain clear and well-documented procedures for3 5the collection,
security, and laboratory analysis of urine specimens.
3.

Proceduresfor Drug Testing.-On December 1, 1989, the

DOT adopted a final rule setting forth detailed drug testing proce30. See Procedures For Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 49 C.F.R.

§ 401 et seq. (1989). Note, however, that lawsuits have delayed implementation of all or part

of the programs for three of the six transportation industries. The Federal Highway Administration has deferred implementation of its random testing and mandatory post-accident testing
requirement due to litigation currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. See International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. DOT, CV-89-70308. In addition, pre-employment drug testing will not be required for drivers who have passed a drug test within the past six months or who have been
subject to random testing during the previous twelve months. Random testing under the Coast
Guard regulations has been declared unconstitutional by a federal district court. See Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, No. 88-3429 (D.C. 1989). The Urban Mass Transportation Administration has suspended implementation of its rule. See Fed. Reg. 1236
(1990).
31. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.21(a) (1989).
32. Note, however, the Federal Highway Administration has deferred implementation of
its random testing and mandatory post-accident testing requirement. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
33. See 49 C.F.R. § 40, App. A Section 3.4 (1989).
34. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.27(b) (1989).
35. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.23 (1989).
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dures to be followed by each of the six transportation industries.3
These testing procedures are based on, but modify, the requirements
under the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter
"DHHS") regulation entitled "Mandatory Guidelines for Federal
Workplace Drug Testing Programs. 31 7 The DHHS Guidelines include procedures for collecting urine samples for drug testing, transmitting samples to testing laboratories and evaluating test results,
quality control measures applicable to the laboratories, record keeping and reporting requirements, and standards and procedures for
DHHS certification of drug testing laboratories. The intent of the
Guidelines is to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of test results
and ensure the privacy of individuals who are tested."
4. Additional Requirements.-In addition to the drug testing
requirements, employers are required to follow strict notification and
record keeping procedures, 39 and must establish Employee Assis40
tance Programs including education and training.
5. Date For Compliance.-Although the DOT rules are effective as of December 21, 1988, industry-specific compliance dates are
provided in regulations issued separately by each of the six (6) divisions under the DOT. 41 For example, the Federal Highway Administration requires motor carriers with 50 or more drivers who are subject to testing, to implement a drug testing program by December
21, 1989.42 Carriers with less than 50 drivers must comply by De43
cember 21, 1990.
D. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Fitness For Duty
Rule
1. Applicability.-The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(hereinafter "NRC"), an agency of the Department of Energy, issued final regulations on June 7, 1989, requiring all private sector
employers who are licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nu36.
37.

See 49 C.F.R. § 40 et seq. (1989).
53 Fed. Reg. 47002(3) (1988).

38. Id.
39. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 391.87 (1989) (stating that motor carriers must record all
results and maintain records for instant inspection).
40. See, e.g., EAP Training Program, 49 C.F.R. § 391.121(d) (1989) (stating that
"EAP training programs for all drivers and supervisory personnel must consist of at least 60

minutes of training.").
41. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.93 (1989).
42. 49 C.F.R. § 391.93(b) (1989).
43. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.93(c) (1989) (stating that "[m]otor carriers with less than 50
drivers subject to testing [on December 21, 1989] are required to implement a controlled substance testing program [by December 21, 1990, for all commercial motor vehicle drivers].").
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clear power reactors, to implement a fitness-for-duty program, which
includes testing of employees for drugs and alcohol."" The program
applies to any individual who is granted unescorted access to "protected areas" within a nuclear power plant, including contractors
45
and vendors providing services within the protected area.
2. Drug Testing.-Unlike the DOD and DOT regulations,
which require testing only for certain illegal drugs, the NRC rule
requires licensees to test for drugs and alcohol.46 Licensees must test
for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, PCP and alcohol
prior to employment, or access to a "protected area," upon reasonable cause, randomly, and on an unannounced basis as a follow-up to
reinstatement of employment. 47 Licensees may test for any controlled substance during a for-cause test.4' The random testing requirement is by far the most comprehensive of all agency regulations: random tests must be conducted at a rate equal to at least
100% of the workforce, and must be administered on a nominal
weekly frequency, at various times during the day to enhance discovery of lunch-time drinking and drug use. 49 Employees who test positive must be removed from access to the site for at least 14 days and
referred to an employee assistance program.5 0 Employees denied access for any subsequent confirmed positive test must be denied unescorted access to the facility for a minimum of 3 years. 51 Anyone
involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs while within a
protected area must be removed for a minimum of 5 years. 52
3. Proceduresfor Drug Testing.-Tests must conform to the
"Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs" issued by the NRC, which essentially follow the HHS
Guidelines, with minor upgrades in quality control to further ensure
the integrity and accuracy of the test results. 3
44. See 10 C.F.R. § 26.2(a) (1990). "(a) The regulations in this Part apply to licensees
authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor. Each licensee shall implement a fitness-for-duty
program which complies with this Part." Id.
45. Id.
46.

10 C.F.R. § 26.20(a) (1990).

47. 10 C.F.R. § 26.24 (1990).
48. 10 C.F.R. § 26.24(a)(3) (1990).
49. See 10 C.F.R. § 26.24(a)(2)(1990). By comparison, prior to deferring its random
testing requirements, the Federal Highway Administration's drug testing rule called for ran-

dom tests at a rate equal to 50% of the drivers subject to testing. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.85
(1990).
50. 10 C.F.R. § 26.27(b)(2)(1990).
51. Id.
52.
53.

See 10 C.F.R. § 26.27(b)(3)(1990).
See 54 Fed. Reg. 24484 (1989).
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4. Additional Requirements.-In addition to drug testing,
each licensee must (1) establish and implement written policies and
procedures regarding fitness for duty;54 (2) train supervisors and escorts; 55 (3) establish an EAP;56 (4) maintain records regarding the
drug testing and fitness for duty programs; 57 (5) conduct inspections;58 and (6) meet various reporting requirements.5 9
5. Date For Compliance.-The NRC final rule became effec-

tive July 7, 1989, and requires drug testing to take place within 180
days of the effective date. 0
III.

STATE AND LOCAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING

LEGISLATION

As of the writing of this Article, thirteen states"1 have enacted
comprehensive statutes which regulate the use of drug and/or alcohol tests in the private sector. The thirteen states are: Connecticut,
Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont.62

Each of these laws restrict, 3 to some degree, the manner 6in4
which drug testing may be conducted by private sector employers.
A majority of these laws require reasonable cause or suspicion that
an employee is using drugs or alcohol prior to testing employees.
Pre-employment and periodic testing during physicals is generally
54. 10 C.F.R. § 26.20 (1990).
55. 10 C.F.R. § 26.22 (1990).
56. 10 C.F.R. § 26.25 (1990).
57. 10 C.F.R. § 26.71(d) (1990).
58. 10 C.F.R. § 26.70 (1990).
59. 10 C.F.R. § 26.73 (1990).
60. See 10 C.F.R. § 26.2(c)(1990) (stating that: "(c) [t]he requirements in this Part
must be implemented by each licensee authorized to construct or operate a nuclear power
reactor no later than January 3, 1990.").
61. San Francisco and Boulder have city ordinances restricting the right to test applicants or employees for drugs. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE art. 33A(1987); BOULDER,
COL, REV. ORDINANCE No. 5195(1988). New York City Ordinance, effective 9/1/90, regulates the testing of school bus drivers. NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 104 (1989).
62. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.51t-31.5bb (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.09(6)(a)(West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ RS23:1601 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 681 (Supp. 1989); MD.
HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § HG17-214.1 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.950-59 (West
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 38-1903 et seq.
(1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.225 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1 (1989); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-38-1 et. seq. (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (1987).
63. See Appendix A for chart outlining the requirements under each of these laws.
64. The New York ordinance actually requires drug testing of bus drivers, but also establishes procedural guidelines restricting the manner in which the tests may be conducted.
See NEW YORK, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 104 (1989).
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permitted, but random testing is generally prohibited unless the individual tested occupies a safety-sensitive position, or is returning from
a drug rehabilitation program, or unless the Federal law requires
such testing.65
In addition to placing restrictions upon the type of employee
drug testing that employers may conduct, most of these state and
local statutes require a number of procedural safeguards to protect
the integrity of the urine sample and the privacy of the individual.
Such safeguards include the use of properly certified laboratories,
confirmatory tests, chain of custody procedures, strict confidentiality
of test results, written notice to applicants and employees, employee
assistance programs, and procedures to ensure privacy in the collection of samples.66
However, while several of the state and local statutes share
many common features, there remains a great deal of disparity with
respect to the specific requirements under each law. 17 For example,
the Maryland and Oregon statutes are silent on the issue of how
many confirmatory tests are required after an initial positive test re69
sult.68 Connecticut and Montana require two confirmatory tests,
though others require only one test.
As a consequence, there is considerable uncertainty among employers as to the parameters of a lawful drug testing program. Further confusion results from the fact that thirty-seven states still do
not have any statutes specifically regulating drug testing in the private sector. Many of these states also have fair employment laws and
other common laws with different standards governing an employer's
right to engage in drug testing. Accordingly, multi-state employers
must pursue exhaustive state-by-state research into the specific requirements of each state's drug testing laws prior to implementing a
substance abuse program, and may need to adopt a different policy
in each state in which they are located.
To provide uniformity in regulating substance abuse testing
throughout the country, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Senator
Boren (D-Oklahoma) have proposed a bill in Congress calling for
minimum federal standards for workplace drug testing in the private
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51x (West 1990).
66. See, Appendix A.
67. See Appendix A.
68. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § HG17-214.1 (1990); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 659.225 (1989).
69. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51x (West 1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304
(1987).
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sector.70 The bill would provide uniformity and consistency in drug
testing standards by preempting conflicting state and local laws. 71
The bill would also provide a number of due process protections in
private drug testing programs, such as standards under which testing
can be administered, procedures for testing, confidentiality of test
results, and a variety of other protections found in many of the state
72
statutes currently in effect.
Federal legislation such as Senate bill 1903 may strike a reasonable balance between proponents who advocate drug testing as a tool
for "winning the war on drugs," and those who oppose drug testing
because of its invasion upon personal privacy. Employers who are
reluctant to establish substance abuse programs due to the legal risks
and inconsistencies between federal, state and local laws may be encouraged to adopt a program once uniform federal standards are in
place.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO DRUG TESTING

A. The Federal Constitution
1. The Fourth Amendment.-(a) Applies to heavily regulated
private companies.-The principles of the fourth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution are paramount in determining the fundamental legality of any public sector drug testing programs. The fourth
amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures, 3 but generally does not apply to private sector
employers. 4
However, the fourth amendment has been applied to the private
sector where extensive state action is involved. For example, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently held that the fourth amendment applied to
drug and alcohol testing conducted by a private railroad company
because the testing was mandated or authorized by federal regulations.7 5 Even in cases where the fourth amendment is clearly inapplicable, courts often rely on federal constitutional analysis in determining the reasonableness of a private sector drug testing program.76
70.

See S. REP. No. 1903, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).

71. Id.
72.

Id.

73. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
74. Id.
75. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S.

-,

109 S. Ct. 1402,

1422 (1989).

76. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr.
194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., No. W-003611-86 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. April 28, 1989) (LEXIS State file).
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In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, the Supreme Court believed that the degree of governmental participation
in a private party's activity should determine whether that private
party should be deemed an agent of the government.7 Thus, Skinner
has been interpreted to mean that where an employer is subject to
extensive governmental regulation, the principles of the fourth
amendment are applicable to the employer.7 8
(b) Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment.-The fourth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 79 The fourth amendment applies both to situations in which a warrant is used, and to
those in which no warrant is procured. If a warrant is used, the
amendment requires that it is not to be issued unless there is probable cause.80 Whether or not there is a warrant, the amendment requires that the search be reasonable. 8 '
To successfully challenge a drug and alcohol testing program
under the Fourth Amendment, a litigant must establish: (1) that the
testing constitutes a search under the amendment, and (2) that the
search is unreasonable.8 2 With respect to the first element, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Skinner and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab that since the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy, these intrusions must
be deemed searches under the fourth amendment.8 3 With respect to
the second element, whether a search is unreasonable, "depends on
all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. Thus, the permissibility of a par77. Skinner, 489 U.S. ., 109 S.Ct. at 1411.
78. See Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique And Analysis Of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence,8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 51 (1990)(analyzing in detail the Supreme
Court's holdings in Skinner and Von Raab).
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S_, 109 S. Ct.
1384, 1390 (1989).
83. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at _., 109 S. Ct. at 1402 (1989); Von Raab, - U.S. at--,
109 S.Ct. at 1390.
Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations
of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of
Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
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ticular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. 84
The "reasonableness" of fourth amendment searches has been
traditionally evaluated by assessing the degree to which police conduct intrudes upon an individual's privacy interests."5 With respect
to drug testing, the reasonableness of these searches has been analyzed in light of the procedures involved and the methods utilized in
the testing of employees. 8
Whether a search is deemed reasonable or not depends on what
society values as deserving of an expectation of privacy.87 In the case
of drug testing, a search is deemed to occur where the employee
tested is required to produce a specimen, usually urine or blood, for
the purpose of forensic testing. 88 The searches involved in drug testing will be found to be reasonable where the methods used to obtain
urine or blood specimens do not intrude upon individuals' privacy
interests which society would view as being entitled to freedom from
such intrusion.89 Courts have thus invalidated drug testing programs
which utilize procedures that subject the employee to undue embarassment or humiliation.90
Lower courts which have ruled on the validity of drug testing
programs in determining the reasonableness of the searches involved,
have held that search warrants are not necessary in order for the
employer to conduct such testing. 1 These decisions were based on
conclusions that search warrants were either inappropriate,9 2 that
such searches fell within the administrative search exception,93 or
84. Skinner, 489 U.S. at _,

109 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Montoya de

Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).

85. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
86.

See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (invalidating a

drug testing program based upon the method by which it was conducted).
87. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 51.
88. See Schermber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
89. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 (stating that because the procedures involved did not entail surgical intrusions into the body, the search involved was
reasonable).
90. See, e.g., Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1507 (stating that the drug test involved was
unreasonable because employees were required to submit urine specimens while under the observation of others).
91. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976) (indicating that the nature of the test involved made a warrant unnecessary).
92. Id.
93.

See, e.g., Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash. 2d 424, 759

P.2d 427 (1988) (holding that the administrative search exception applies to the testing of
nuclear power industry employees).
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94
some other exception to the warrant requirement.
While the balancing of interests usually requires some quantum
of individual suspicion before concluding that a search is reasonable,
the Court in Skinner acknowledged that in limited circumstances,
where the privacy interests are minimal, and where the government's
5
interest is legitimate, reasonable suspicion may not be required.,
This is an important ruling because it gives employers a legal authority for conducting a variety of drug testing programs without
reasonable suspicion, including periodic testing during physicals and
automatic post-accident testing where the privacy interests of the
tested individual are minimal compared to the employer's interest in
implementing the test."6
The Supreme Court in Skinner noted the following factors in
determining that the balance of interest tipped in favor of the Railroad's right to conduct post-accident drug testing without reasonable
suspicion:
1) the testing program reduced the intrusiveness of the collection
process by requiring that samples be furnished in a medical environment without direct observation;
2) the expectations of privacy of a railroad employee are diminished because of their participation in a heavily-regulated industry;
3) the governmental interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compellingh.e.,railroad employees hold
safety-sensitive positions); and
4) testing is required only after a "major train accident," "impact
accident," or "any train incident that involves a fatality to any onduty railroad employee.'' 7

Thus, the recent Supreme Court decision in Skinner applies a
balancing test to determine that suspicionless testing is allowed
where governmental interests outweigh the intrusions upon the individual's privacy. 8 Factors which weigh heavily in favor of permitting
suspicionless testing include the government's interest in protecting
the safety of the public at large and ensuring that employees in
safety sensitive positions are not impaired while performing their du94. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489-91 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(discussing the right of employers to make warrantless searches to determine employees' ability to perform their duties safely).
95. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.
96. Id. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1421.
, 109 S.Ct. at 1048-1109.
97. Id. at
, 109 S.Ct. at 1048-49 (stating that suspicionless testing
98. See Skinner, 489 U.S.
is only a minimal intrusion in light of the government's compelling interest in conducting such

tests).
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ties. 9 These governmental concerns have thus been deemed to be
highly significant while the intrusions caused by such testing have
100
been labeled minimal.
Under these circumstances, post-accident testing without reasonable cause passes .constitutional muster because the intrusion on
privacy rights is deemed minimal compared to the employer's interest in assuring itself that its employees occupying safety-sensitive positions are free from the effects of drugs or alcohol.10 ' However, the
Skinner court, did not address the constitutionality of a random drug
testing program. 02 While there are currently no cases which have
decided the federal constitutionality of random drug testing in the
private sector, courts have generally upheld random drug tests in the
public sector only for employees in safety-sensitive job classifications,
and where there is evidence of wide-spread use among the affected
employees.' 0
2. Other ConstitutionalProvisions.-Plaintiffshave also challenged drug testing programs based on the first, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments, 04 arguing that the testing procedures or some other
aspect of the program has violated their rights to due process, equal
protection, privacy, and freedom of religion. 105 In general, these
claims have been unsuccessful where the testing program incorporated legal safeguards, such as use of non-discriminatory testing
practices, chain of custody procedures, confidentiality, adequate notice, properly certified- laboratories, confirmatory tests, and other
procedures designed to promote fairness and to minimize the intrusiveness of the drug testing program.106
B. State Constitutions
Private employers who are not subject to claims arising under
the Federal Constitution may nonetheless be subject to claims based
on a state constitutional right to privacy in those states that have
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.

102. Id. at - 109 S.Ct. at 1408-10.
103. See, e.g., Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988).

104. See, e.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
105. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143 (referring to selective enforcement of urine testing of jockeys as denying them equal protection of the laws); Rushton, 844 F.2d at 564-66
(discussing plaintiffs' contention that the drug testing program violated their First Amendment
rights).
106. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1139-41.
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applied their constitution to private employers. 10 7 A California appeals court recently held in Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corporation
that private sector drug testing programs are subject to scrutiny
under the California constitutional right of privacy.'0 8 In particular,
the court noted that the right to privacy was added to the state constitution in part to restrain both the government and private parties
09
in the collection of information about individuals.
In Wilkinson, the plaintiff was denied employment as a copy
editor after she refused to submit to a drug test mandated by the
company." 0 The plaintiff alleged that the pre-employment drug test
violated her right of privacy under the California state constitution."' Following U.S. constitutional analysis, the court balanced the
job applicant's expectation of privacy against the private employer's
2
interest in a drug and alcohol free work environment." Notwithstanding its determination that the California constitutional right of
privacy applies to private employees, the court affirmed drug testing
as a valid means to determine an applicant's fitness for employment.1 3 The most important factor in the court's decision to uphold
the company's right to conduct pre-employment tests for drugs and
alcohol was that job applicants have a lesser expectation of privacy
than current employees." 4 Since a urinalysis already is part of the
pre-employment physical examination, the drug test "is only slightly
more intrusive than the procedures which plaintiffs already reasona5
bly had to expect as job seekers with private business.""1 Under ordinary circumstances, job applicants are aware that employers require disclosure of private information in the course of a job
116
interview.
107. See Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, _, 264 Cal. Rptr.
194, 200 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1989) (discussing the privacy provision under CAL. CONST. art. I,

§ 1).
108.
109.

264 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
Id. at -,
Id. "Common experience with the ever-increasing use of computers in contempo-

110.

Id. at

111.
112.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at

rary society confirms that the amendment was needed and intended to safeguard individual
privacy from intrusion by both private and governmental action." Id.

113.
114.

264 Cal. Rptr. at 197.

-,

,

264 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
264 Cal. Rptr. at 203.

,

264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.

.,

Id.

115. Id. at

116. Id. Other factors considered by the Court in Wilkinson which weighed in favor of

the company's right to test its job applicants were: (1) the drug testing program gave advance
notice that any offer of employment was contingent upon consent to drug and alcohol testing;
(2) the samples were collected in a medical environment by persons unrelated to the employer;
(3) applicants furnished the samples unobserved by others; (4) the results were kept confiden-
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Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey recently applied its
state constitution in holding that drug testing in the private workplace without individualized reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional
under New Jersey's State Constitution. *"' In Hennessey v. Coastal
Eagle Point Oil Company, the plaintiff was discharged after failing
an unannounced random drug test. 18 The plaintiff sued, claiming his
discharge was a violation of New Jersey public policy.1" 9 The court
noted that the company's random drug testing program violated
New Jersey's public policy because the testing was not based on "individualized reasonable suspicion."120 The court further held that

even if the test were based on reasonable suspicion, it would violate
public policy because it lacked necessary due process safeguards
such as notice to employees, opportunities for rehabilitation and confirmatory tests, and other standards for conducting the test.' 2 ' "Reasonableness in testing follows reasonable suspicion. Both are necessary to render a drug testing program valid. A drug testing program
administered after reasonable suspicion is still invalid if conducted in
an unreasonable manner without proper safeguards.' 22
V.

THE IMPACT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS UPON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE POLICY

Determining the lawfulness of a substance abuse testing program is further complicated by the fact that fair employment laws
may, under certain circumstances, prohibit adverse employment decisions based on the use of drugs or alcohol. Both the federal government and the states have enacted statutes protecting the handitial; (5) drug test results were not reported to the employer. The medical lab merely informed
the employer whether the applicant passed the entire physical exam, which included drug and
alcohol testing; (6) the the applicant was entitled to know what portion of the test he or she

failed; (7) the company provided an opportunity for the applicant to challenge the test results;
and (8) the applicant could reapply for employment in six months. Id.
117. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., No. W-003611-86 (N.J. Super. Ct.
April 28, 1989) (LEXIS State file 474) (stating that "New Jersey courts have consistently
held that public policy must be broadly construed, and that sources of public policy include
both federal and state constitutional provisions. . . ."). Id. at LEXIS State file 17. The New
Jersey Constitution states in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
118.

Id. at LEXIS 4.

119. Id. at LEXIS 6.
120. Id. at LEXIS 10.
121. Id. at LEXIS 12-13.
122. Id. at LEXIS 12 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.
Super. 461, (App. Div. 1987)).
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capped and/or
discrimination.
A.

other

protected

classes

from

employment

Federal Employment Discrimination Laws

1. The Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990.-(a). Covers All Employers with Fifteen or More Employ2
ees.-The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) ' was
signed into law on July 26, 1990, and will become effective for employers with twenty-five or more workers on July 26, 1992, and for
employers with fifteen or more employees on July 26, 1994.124 Unlike the federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973,125 which ap-

plies only to the federal government, federal contractors, and employers receiving federal financial aid, the ADA applies to all
employers with fifteen or more employees. In addition, the ADA provides much broader protection for individuals with disabilities than
many state "handicap discrimination" laws or the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. Thus, even employers who are covered under existing
federal and state handicap laws must analyze the effects of this new
law on their current compliance efforts.
b. Individuals Protected under the ADA.-Title I of the
ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability ....-126 A "disability" includes "(i) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major of life activities of such individual: (ii) a record of such
impairment [e.g., an applicant who had a heart attack but currently
is capable of working]; or (iii) being regarded as having such an
impairment.' 27 A "qualified individual with a disability" is one
accommodation, can perform the
who, with or without reasonable
28
job.1
the
of
essential functions
c. Current Illegal Drug Users Are Not Protected.-The
ADA specifically excludes from the term "qualified individual with a
disability" any employee or applicant who is currently engaged in
the illegal use of drugs.'29 Although current use of alcohol is not
123. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, (1990) [hereinafter

"ADA"].
124. ADA § 108.
125. 29 U.S.C. 790 et seq. (1982).
126. ADA § 102(a).
127. ADA § 3(2)(A).
128. ADA § 101(8).
129. ADA § 104(a). "Illegal use of drugs" means "the use of drugs, the possession or
distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (21 USC 812). Such
term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision of a licensed health care
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specifically excluded, employers may prohibit the illegal use of drugs
and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employees, may require that employees not be under the influence of alcohol or illegal
drugs at the workplace, and may hold an employee who uses illegal
drugs or is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performances as other employees. 130
However, an employer may not discriminate against an individual who is not engaged in illegal drug use and (i) has successfully
completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise
rehabilitated successfully, (ii) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program, or (iii) is erroneously regarded as engaging in
illegal drug use. 13 '
d. Disabled Individuals Must Be Reasonably Accommodated.-Under the ADA, employers are required to make a "reasonable accommodation" to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless to do so
would impose an "undue hardship."'3 2 While the ultimate limitation
is "undue hardship," defined by the ADA as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense ...

it is difficult to know where

that boundary actually lies until court decisions interpreting the law
begin to give it shape. Factors to be considered in determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship include
the nature and cost of the accommodation, and the size, type, and
financial resources of the employer.'3
Examples of reasonable accommodation include making facilities accessible; modifying work schedules; job restructuring; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices; modification of examinations, training materials or policies; providing qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar
35
measures.1
e. Restrictions on Medical Examinations and Other Inquiries.-The ADA specifically prohibits requiring a medical examination or any other inquiry regarding an individual's disability unless
the examination or inquiry is "job-related and consistent with business necessity."' 36 Thus, an employer will no longer be able to ask
professional, or other uses authorized by [law]." ADA § 101(6)(A).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See ADA § 104(c).
ADA § 104(b).
ADA § 102(b)(5).
ADA § 101(10)(A).
ADA § 101(10)(B).
ADA § 101(9).
ADA § 102(c)(4)(A).
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applicants, "Do you have any disabilities which would limit your
ability to perform this job?" Similarly, preemployment questionnaires that ask about an applicant's medical history are illegal under
the ADA. An inquiry must be strictly limited to an applicant's or an
employee's ability to perform job-related functions with or without
reasonable accommodation.
Employers may require medical examinations after an offer of
employment has been made to a job applicant, and may condition an
offer of employment on the results of such examination if (i) all applicants are subject to the examination regardless of disability; (ii)
information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of
the applicant is maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record; and (iii) the
are used only in accordance
results of such medical examinations
1 37
ADA.
the
of
I
Title
with
f. Drug Testing Is Not a Medical Examination.-Significantly, the ADA specifically provides that drug testing
to determine illegal drug use is not considered a medical examination.1 38 Nothing in the ADA prohibits, encourages, or authorizes
139
drug testing or making decisions based on a drug test result.
Under the ADA, employers can "adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug
testing ...

"4

g. Improper Administration of a Drug Testing Program
May Run Afoul of the ADA.-Given the ADA's somewhat laissezfaire approach to drug testing, employers must generally look to
other federal, state, and local laws in determining the legal parameters of a drug testing program. However, the ADA's neutral language on drug testing should not lull employers into disregarding the
ADA altogether. There are a number of provisions under the Act
which impact upon the lawfulness of a drug testing program. For
example, an employer's policy of excluding from employment all job
applicants who test positive for illegal drugs, without establishing a
time period after which an employee may reapply for employment,
may violate section 104 of the Act, which protects individuals who
participate in or have successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program. Drug testing policies should limit the time period in which
a job applicant is considered ineligible for employment to avoid the
137.
138.

ADA § 102(c)(3).
ADA § 104(d)(1).

139. ADA
140.

§ 104(d)(2).

ADA § 104(b).
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possibility of unlawful discrimination under the ADA and other fair
employment laws against former drug users who participate in or
successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program.
Lack of accuracy in using or interpreting drug test results is
another area of vulnerability under the ADA. Since individuals protected under the ADA include those erroneously regarded as engaging in illegal drug use, false positives and other inaccurate test results may give rise to a discrimination lawsuit under the ADA.
Indeed, this argument has been successfully advanced under other
fair employment laws, including the New York Human Rights
Law.141
2. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.(a). Handicap DiscriminationProhibited.-Thefederal Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter "Act") prohibits the federal
government, federal contractors, and employers receiving federal financial aid from discriminating against "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" solely on the basis of their handicaps. 4 ' The Vocational Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped individual" as
one "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (ii) has
a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment.' 43
b. Must Be "Otherwise Qualified."--The Act protects
only those handicapped individuals who are "otherwise qualified"
from employment discrimination. A handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" if (i) notwithstanding the handicap, he or she can
perform the essential duties of the job in question; or (ii) he or she is
capable of performing those basic duties with a reasonable accommodation which would not impose an undue hardship on the employer; and (iii) his or her performance would not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of the handicapped person or others. 44
Whether a handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" is a factual question to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Under the Act, medical examinations may be conducted in connection with employment decisions, so long as their use does not violate the Act's prohibition against handicap discrimination. Thus, for
example, an employer may not, solely because of an impairment re141. See Doe v. Roe, 143 Misc. 2d 156, 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1989), affd 553 N.Y.S.2d
364 (Ist Dept. 1990).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1982).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
144. See 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1989); 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1989).
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vealed during such an examination, deny employment where (i) the
handicap does not prevent the individual from performing the essential functions of the job in question, or (ii) reasonable accommodation of the handicap will enable the individual to perform those functions, and (iii) the handicap does not pose a direct threat to the
property or safety of others.
c. Alcoholism and Drug Dependence Are Handicaps.-Alcoholism and drug dependence are defined as handicaps in
interpretive regulations' 45 and have been held to be handicaps by
federal courts. 146 However, the Act excludes workers with current
drug or alcohol problems from its "handicapped" definition if such
impairment interferes47with their ability to work or poses a danger to
persons or property.'
d. Testing Must Take Place After Conditional Offer of
Employment.-The regulations interpreting the Act also provide
that medical examinations may take place only after an offer of employment has been made, unless the individual was conditionally
placed in a job pool or on an eligibility list prior to the medical
exam.' 48 The medical results must be the last factor evaluated by the
employer before a final decision to make an offer of employment is
made.

14 9

Thus, employers covered by the Act may condition an offer of
employment on the results of a substance abuse test conducted prior
to the employee's entrance on duty, but only after all other employment eligibility decisions have been made. The intent of this provision is, presumably, to reduce the possibility of employment decisions
made on the basis of a handicap or perceived handicap which does
not prevent reasonable performance of the job.
3. Title VII.-(a). Discriminatory Motive Not
Needed.-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964150 prohibits employers, both public and private, from discriminating against 5 employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' ' To
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1989); 28 C.F.R. 41.31 (1989).
See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
See 29 C.F.R. § 32.15(c)(5) (1989).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-17 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

(a) it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-

(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-

nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or

national origin.
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establish a violation of the Act, a discriminatory purpose need not be
proved. Rather, an employment practice which merely has a "disparate impact" upon a protected minority group may violate the
Act. 152 Accordingly, an alcohol or drug testing program which has a
discriminatory impact upon a protected group may give rise to a
cause of action against an employer under Title VII.
b. "Job Relatedness" Is a Defense.-A prima facie violation of the Act may be established by statistical evidence showing
that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members
of a protected minority group equal access to employment opportunities.15 3 Once a prima facie case of disparate impact is established,
employers have the burden of producing evidence that the practice
has a legitimate business purpose or is "job-related."1 54 However, the
burden of persuasion remains with the litigant to prove he or she was
denied employment "because of" his or her protected status.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,155 the Transit
Authority enforced a general policy against employing persons who
use narcotic drugs, including those receiving methadone maintenance
treatment for curing heroin addiction. Two employees of the Transit
Authority who were dismissed while they were receiving methadone
treatment and two persons who were refused employment because
they were receiving methadone treatment brought a class action suit,
alleging that the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion of all former
heroin addicts receiving methadone treatments was illegal under Title VII. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that statistical evidence
alone is sufficient to establish employment discrimination under Title
VII, but held that in this particular case the statistical evidence relied on was not sufficient.' 56 The Court further noted that even if the
statistical evidence was sufficient, it was rebutted by the Transit Authority's demonstration that 'its narcotics policy was job-related.
Consequently, the Transit Authority's rejection of methadone users,
in spite of the claimed disparate impact, was considered a legitimate
business necessity because transit workers who use drugs could pose
a danger to the public. However, similar programs which test for
152. Courts have applied either a "disparate treatment" theory or a "disparate impact"
theory to Title VII claims. Under a "disparate impact" suit a plaintiff is not required to prove
discriminatory motive, whereas in a "disparate treatment" suit, proof of discriminatory intent
is critical.
153. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2124 (1989).
154. Id. at 2125.
155. 440 U.S. 568 (1978).
156. The Supreme Court recently held that statistical evidence alone is not enough to
establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2123.
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nonsafety-sensitive positions, and for which an employer cannot show
that a drug or alcohol screen measures work-related criteria, may be
vulnerable to a Title VII claim to the extent it statistically discriminates against a protected group.
B.

State Employment Discrimination Laws

1. State Laws Are Similar to Federal Laws.-Most states
have fair employments laws similar to Title VII which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
Many states also have handicap discrimination laws with standards
similar to the ADA and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. The extent to which these laws protect alcohol- or drug-impaired individuals varies from state to state. Employers located in those states that
specifically include alcoholism and drug dependency as protected
handicaps must be careful to prepare their substance abuse policies
in accordance with all applicable federal and state fair employment
laws by maintaining a policy of nondiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation with respect to recovering addicts or alcoholics, and
those having a medical history reflecting treatment for this
condition.
2. New York's Rulings on Inquiries.-One fairly representative example of the protections afforded substance abusers under
human rights laws is the New York State Division of Human Rights
Rulings on Inquiries, which prohibits drug or alcohol testing unless
1 ' 57
the testing is based on a "bona fide occupational qualification.
The Rulings state, in pertinent part:
An employer may not require a job applicant to submit to a medical examination, including laboratory and psychological tests, as a
condition precedent to employment, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification.1 58
Althought the Rulings are specifically directed at preemployment examinations, the division has stated that it will interpret the
rulings to apply to substance abuse testing before and after an offer
of employment.
157.

In construing the term "bona fide occupational qualification," the New York

Human Rights Division had consistently followed the general principle that, subject to the
particular facts in specific cases, the freedom from disability of an employee or an applicant
for employment will not be deemed a bona fide occupational qualification unless these attrib-

utes are material to job performance (i.e., freedom from current use of alcohol or drugs is
material to job performance).
158. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS RULINGS ON INQUIRIES §
at 21 [hereinafter RULINGS ON INQUIRIES].
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3. Doe v. Roe: "Job Relatedness" Must Be Established.-The
Rulings on Inquiries are interpretive guidelines. Consequently, they
do not have the legal force of a statute or regulation and are not
binding on the agency or the courts. Nonetheless, the Rulings will be
relied on by the agency-and may be used by the courts to interpret
the New York State Human Rights Law.
Indeed, that has already occurred in a recent New York case,
where a job applicant alleged that an employer had unlawfully (a)
subjected him to a urinalysis as a condition of employment without
demonstrating that such test was job-related and (b) refused to hire
him on the basis of the test result without evaluating his capacity to
reasonably perform in the position sought. 159 Relying specifically on
the Rulings on Inquiries, the New York Supreme Court found that
the plaintiff had alleged a cause of action under the Human Rights
Law, and refused to dismiss the case. 60
The New York Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling, resting its decision on an additional factor. It held that employers who seek to test applicants for drugs must show:
that the standard or test bears a rational relationship to and is a
valid predictor of employee job performance, and that it does not
create an artificial and unnecessary barrier to employment which
operates, invidiously to discriminate on the basis of an impermissible classification. While [an employer] may be legitimately entitled
to discriminate against users of controlled narcotic substances,
when challenged it must come forward with evidence establishing
that its testing method accurately distinguishes between opiate
users and consumers of lawful foodstuffs or medications. 61
Given the court's holding that a drug test must be a "valid predictor" of job performance, employers may well face a heavy burden
in justifying a drug testing program. Arguably, to meet the "valid
predictor" standard, an employer must establish that (a) the test results are accurate not only in detecting the presence of prohibited
substances but also in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful
substances; and (b) the test is capable of measuring, to some degree,
whether the tested individual's job performance has been impaired
due to the presence of these substances. Since a drug test cannot, by
itself, establish current impairment, this latter prong could conceiva159. See Doe v. Roe, 142 Misc 2d 156, 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1989), affd 553 N.Y.S.2d
364 (1st Dept. 1990).
160. Id.
161. Doe, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The plaintiff claimed that the test result was a false
positive due to his ingestion of a health food bread containing poppy seeds. Id.
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bly rule out all forms of drug testing unless there is some other evidence of impairment or "reasonable suspicion" in addition to the
drug test result.
Furthermore, the appellate division in Doe v. Roe noted "that
the definition of disability in the Human Rights Law (Executive
Law § 292[211c]) is broad enough to embrace persons who, like the
plaintiff, contend they are not disabled but whom the potential employer perceives (wrongfully) to be disabled."'1 62 By protecting recreational or casual drug users as being "disabled" under the Human
Rights Law, the appellate division extended protection against disability discrimination well beyond that required by the Americans
With Disabilities Act or the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act.
Indeed, Doe v. Roe suggests that anyone who is subject to an adverse
employment decision based on a positive drug test is potentially protected as disabled under the New York Human Rights Law, regardless of present or past drug addiction.
In contrast, the New Jersey Attorney General has issued an
opinion that even individuals who are addicted to illegal drugs are
not considered handicapped under the state's Law Against Discrimination.' 6 3 The attorney general points out that the Law Against Discrimination specifically provides that its terms are not to be "con6
strued to require or authorize any act prohibited by law."' ' To give
drug addicts handicapped status would "authorize" their illegal activities in taking drugs. 6 '
In addition, criminal laws that bar the use of controlled substances were designed to prevent the debilitating consequences of the
use of such substances. To give users of illegal drugs an "elevated"
employment status because of their illegal activity would fly in the
face of policies underlying these criminal statutes and numerous
other laws and policies promoting drug-free workplaces. For these
reasons, the attorney general opined that persons addicted to 66illegal
drugs are not protected by the Law Against Discrimination.
4. Von Raab: U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Across-TheBoard Testing.-Analogously, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
67
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, indicates that
162. Id.
163. Peter N. Perretti, Jr., Attorney General, Drug Addiction as a Protected Handicap
under the New Jersey Law against Discrimination (October 6, 1989).

164. Id.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.

167.

489 U.S-., 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
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the Court is not prepared to approve "carte blanche" mandatory
testing of customs service employees seeking promotion to specific
positions 6 8 without evidence that people occupying these positions
are likely to gain access to classified information. 169 Although the
testing program was analyzed under the fourth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution (which in most cases does not apply to private
companies), the Court's reasoning calls into question the "job-relatedness" and reasonableness of "across-the-board" testing programs
which fail to consider the nature of the position being sought. 170
C. Establishing "Job Relatedness" or Bona-Fide Occupational
Qualifications
Given the recent case law developments defining the legal parameters of drug testing,'171- employers assume additional risk under
federal and state fair employment laws by testing their employees
and job applicants without consideration for the type of position occupied or being sought. The risk can be substantially reduced by establishing "job relatedness" or that the testing is based on a BonaFide Occupational Qualification (hereinafter "BFOQ").17 2 This is
easier to establish where the jobs covered by the testing policy are
safety-sensitive, critical, subject to pervasive state or federal regulation, or would significantly harm the public if substance abuse were
73
undetected.1
1. Safety-Sensitive Positions.-Freedom from current drug
and alcohol abuse could well be considered a BFOQ for many
safety-sensitive job classifications. For example, current drug or alcohol users who operate heavy machinery or drive company vehicles
could be deemed to pose a serious threat to the health and safety of
themselves as well as to the public if their substance abuse were
undetected.
2. Regulated Positions.-Job relatedness may also be established for those positions covered under the new agency regulations
168.

These positions include accountants, accountant technicians, animal caretakers, at-

torneys, baggage clerks, co-op students, electric equipment repairers, mail clerks/assistants,
and messengers. 489 U.S. at ., 109 S. Ct. at 1397.
169. 489 U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.

170. See id.
171. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
172. RULINGS ON INQUIRIES, supra note 158, § 7(a), at 15-16.

173. For example, the Government's concern for railway safety justified the substance
abuse testing program in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S-, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 1414 (1989).
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4
requiring drug testing and/or the DFWA.17 Although the DFWA
does not require drug testing, it does require covered employers to
1 75
Armake a good faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace.
guably, implementation of a pre-employment drug and alcohol
screen could be deemed as part of that "good faith effort."
3. Managerial Positions.-In addition, freedom from current
drug use in managerial positions involving a high degree of responsibility is likely to be considered a BFOQ because drug use in these
positions may have a critical impact on public confidence, worker
176 However,
morale, and employee attitudes toward the company.
these positions are probably lower on the "job relatedness" spectrum
than those directly impacting upon health or safety.
4. Clerical or Administrative Positions.-Those positions
which will be most problematic in establishing a BFOQ are those
which do not affect health or safety, and which involve a relatively
lower degree of responsibility, such as secretarial, clerical or certain
administrative positions.117 Arguably, the need to establish job relatedness for these positions may be minimized to the extent an employer is able to point to a track record of drug use among these
employees.

D.

The "Current Impairment" and Accuracy Controversy

One of the most controversial aspects of using drug tests as a
device for making employment decisions is that drug tests do not
7
measure current impairment .1 Studies suggest that urine samples
of a long-term heavy user of marijuana may yield a positive result as
long as three or more weeks after the individual stops using the
drug. ' 9 Therefore, it may be argued that successful completion of a
drug urinalysis is not a bona fide occupational qualification since the
174. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988).
175. See 41 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1)(G)(1988).
176. Defendants in Doe argued in their appellate brief that freedom from drug use is a
"necessary occupational qualification for a financial analyst who is required to exemplify high
moral character and integrity and who is expected to exercise judgment in difficult situations."
See Brief for Appellant, Doe v. Roe, 553 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Ist Dept, 1990) (No. 7180/88).
177. The court in Von Raab questioned whether extending drug testing to lower responsibility employees served the government's objectives of protecting classified information. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at_.., 109 S. Ct. at 1397. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for
the determination of whether such a program should be extended to lower responsibility employees. Id. at_. 109 S.Ct. at 1397.
178. See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of off-duty use
of drugs).
179. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUsE, UIUNE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE, 73
(1986) [hereinafter "NIDA"].
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test does not establish whether an individual was impaired at the
time the sample was given.18 0
Proponents of drug testing argue that the debilitating effects of
long-term drug abuse have the potential for affecting an individual
long after the immediate effects of the drug have dissipated. For example, residual effects of drug abuse may persist when a worker returns to work the following day. Hung-over effects and withdrawal
symptoms may result in decreased reliability and diligence. Off-site
drug use may also result in increased absenteeism and medical costs,
thus having an adverse effect on staffing and possibly safety. Finally,
an individual who uses illegal drugs off-duty may be more likely to
use them on-duty than someone who does not use drugs at all. It
may therefore be a reasonable conclusion that the off-duty abuse of
drugs directly or indirectly affects job performance and/or safety.
In addition to the issue of current impairment, those opposed to
drug testing have voiced concern over the reliability and accuracy of
drug test results. According to a study published by the Federal Aviation Administration, 81 one out of every 100 initial screening tests
results in a false positive test result. 8 2 Inaccurate immunoassay test
results may also occur from "cross-reactivity," where the test will
show illegal drug metabolites in the urine from harmless or lawful
substances.'83 Studies show, for example, that eating large quantities
of poppy seeds may result in a positive immunoassay test result for
180. See NIDA, supra note 89, at 39-40 (stating that blood testing provides a more
specific indication of impairment). However, blood testing has several disadvantages, such as
the need for sterile conditions and the enhanced potential for lawsuits based on assault, battery
and other legal theories.
181. Anti-Drug Program for Personnel Engaged in Specified Aviation Activities, 53 Fed.
Reg. 47024 (1988).
182.

53 Fed. Reg. 47032 (1988).

183. See id. (giving as an example a positive drug test result occurring after having
eaten poppy seeds). The F.A.A. believes that the Department of Transportation's guidelines
for drug testing and the medical officer's reviewing process will guard against false positive test
results:
The D.O.T. procedures will provide an individual with an opportunity to report any
legal or prescription drugs that he or she may be taking at the time of collection of

the specimen. The [medical review officer's] broad authority to interpret each confirmed positive test result, to evaluate an employee based on [his] knowledge of drug
abuse disorders, and to verify that a confirmed positive test result is accurate should
preclude misidentification of food substances or licit drugs taken in accordance with
a valid prescription.
53 Fed. Reg. 47033 (1988). But see Doe, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 365 n.l (where plaintiff-respondent

"contended that even the most specific test procedure, gas chromatography with
mass spec-

trometry (GC/MS) (which [defendant] apparently used) cannot distinguish the morphine and
codeine resulting from poppy seed consumption from the morphine and codeine that are metabolized from heroin and are contained in prescription drugs."). Id.
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up to 60 hours after ingestion. 8 4 In fact, the plaintiff in Doe v. Roe
Inc. attributed a positive test result for opiates to his ingestion of a
health bread containing poppy seeds." 5
Other examples of cross reactivity leading to false-positive test
results include the popular antihistamine "diphenhydramine," which
may register positive for methadone under the EMIT test, and the
antihypertensive agent "labetalol," which erroneously may give a
86
false-positive result for amphetamines using the EMIT procedure.
However, false positive test results and cross reactivity can be significantly reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by using the GC/MS con8
firmatory test and proper quality control procedures.
VI.

COMMON LAW REMEDIES

Recently, applicants, employees and former employees have attempted to use common law "tort" theories to challenge substance
abuse testing programs such as invasion of privacy, defamation, and
1 88
Below are
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
a number of court decisions in which plaintiffs have alleged that
some aspect of the employer's testing program constituted a tortious
injury to the employee or prospective employee.
A.

Defamation

To create common law tort liability for defamation there generally must be "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
8 9 Acor the existence of special harm caused by the publication."'
cordingly, private employees may successfully bring a defamation
action against an employer who published a positive drug test result
with knowledge of its possible inaccuracy.
184. NIDA, supra note 179, at 99.
185. Doe, 143 Misc. 2d at 157.
186. NIDA, supra note 179, at 51.
187. See 53 Fed. Reg. 47,032 (1988) (stating that several courts have determined that
the GC/MS confirmation test is virtually 100% accurate assuming that proper chain-of-custody procedures are implemented).
188. See infra notes 193-239 and accompanying text.
189. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976). But see Churchey v. Adolf Coors
Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (holding that an employer can be liable in defamation
for foreseeable "self-publication" if the employer had reason to believe that the discharged
employee would be under a strong compulsion to inform a third person, such as a prospective
employer, of the contents of the defamatory statement).
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In Houston Belt and Terminal Railway Company v. Wherry,1 0
a former railroad switchman successfully sued his employer for defamation where the employer falsely accused him of using drugs.19 1 In
this case, the employee was discharged when a urinalysis test showed
the presence of methadone.192 A subsequent test revealed the presence of a compound with characteristics resembling methadone, but
showed that the compound was not methadone.193 Despite the second
negative urinalysis test, the employee was terminated for being an
"unsafe employee." 19 ' The employer published a report stating that
methadone traces were found in the plaintiff's system, and sent the
inaccurate report to seven company officials, knowing its falsity.1 15
On that basis, the Texas Appeals Court affirmed that the employer's
publication of the inaccurate report accusing the plaintiff of drug
abuse was libelous,"" and the plaintiff was awarded $150,000 in
compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages.1 97
B. Invasion of Privacy
An employee who fails to establish a defamation action against
the employer due to lack of falsity may nonetheless have a claim for
invasion of privacy. Truth is no defense to an invasion of privacy
claim.19 8 Under the Restatement of Torts (Second),
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.199
Thus, an employer who publicizes the results of a drug test, even if
completely accurate, is subject to potential tort liability under the
common law theory of invasion of privacy, if the publication would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 200
In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Incorporated,20 1 an em190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 753-55.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652D (1976).
Id.
See id.
780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
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ployee claimed he had been pressured into taking a polygraph exam20 2 He also
ination after his employer had accused him of drug use.
stated that during the examination he was asked about matters unre20 3
lated to his employment which were private to him. When the examiner's polygraph report indicated that O'Brien was lying about using drugs, O'Brien was dismissed. 4
The jury found that the employer's investigative techniques
"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and were invasive
of plaintiffs privacy."2 0 5 The court affirmed a jury award of
208
$448,000 for defamation of character and invasion of privacy. The
court rejected Papa Gino's defense that O'Brien had contracted
away his right to privacy because he had received a company person20 7
nel manual forbidding drug use by employees.
Alternatively, some courts have rejected privacy claims based
on exposure to drug testing. For example, a federal court interpreting New York law has held that the common law tort of invasion of
privacy in New York is limited to cases where an individual's name,
portrait, or picture is used for commercial exploitation without his or
her written consent.208 Accordingly, the federal court of appeals held
cannot sue for invasion of privacy
that in New York, an employee
20 9
testing.
drug
caused by
Similarly, an employee in South Carolina, discharged on the ba21 0 The
sis of a positive drug test result, sued for invasion of privacy.
South Carolina District Court ruled that the invasion of privacy
claim failed because (1) the employer had not acted with "a blatant
and shocking disregard" of the employee's rights, and (2) the test
202. Id. at 1070-71.
203. Id. at 1071.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1071.
206. Id. at 1070.
207. Id. at 1072.
208. See Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987) (relying on Freihofer v.
Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 480 N.E.2d 349, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1985) and cases cited
therein). Freihofer reiterated that there is no common-law right of privacy in New York, except for commercial exploitation without written consent. Freihofer, 65 N.Y.2d at 140, 480
N.E.2d at 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 739. In Freihofer,the court held that a newspaper did not
invade the privacy rights of a divorcing couple, when articles were published detailing specific
parts of the court files pertaining to the divorce and the marital problems of the plaintiffs. Id.
209. Mack, 814 F.2d at 123.
210. See Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.C.S.C.
1985). The plaintiff also sued for wrongful discharge, violation of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Satterfield, 617 F. Supp.
at 1360. The court rejected each of the claims. Id. at 1361-69.
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results and the reason for termination were not publicized.2 11
An unreasonable search for drugs may also give rise to a common law action for invasion of privacy. 12 In K-Mart Corporation
Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 113 a private employee brought suit against
the employer for invasion of privacy, claiming that the employer's
search of her locker and purse without her consent violated her "legitimate expectation" of privacy.2 14 Texas law defines invasion of
privacy as "an intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of
another that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, 2 15 or as "the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person
of ordinary sensibilities .... ,"116 The Texas Court of Appeals held
that the employer's improper intrusion into an area where the employee had manifested an expectation of privacy (i.e., by providing a
lock for her own locker, at her own expense and with management's
consent) alone gave her a right to recover.21 7 The court noted that
had the lock been supplied by the employer, the intrusion would
have been reasonable, and therefore not actionable. 218
C. Emotional Distress
219 a plainIn Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation,
tiff filed suit in Louisiana state court after he was discharged for
testing "positive" for the presence of marijuana. 220 Kelley was tested
as part of Schlumberger's drug testing program for offshore oil drilling employees. 22 ' To insure against substitute or adulteration of
urine samples, a representative of the company watched as the plaintiff provided a sample.222 This was not only a critical component of
the testing program, but it was also the core of Kelley's complaint.223

211.

Id. at 1370.

212. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRmS § 652B (1976). "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly
213.
214.
215.

offensive to a reasonable person." Id.
677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 636.

216. Id. at 636.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 637-38.
Id. at 637.
849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
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During the trial Kelley testified that he was "'disgusted by the
whole idea of someone being paid to look at [him] while [he]
urinated.' "224

In his second amended complaint, Kelley alleged "invasion of
privacy" under the Louisiana Constitution; tortious invasion of privacy; wrongful discharge; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation.225 Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict of $125,000 in damages
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2
The Federal Court of Appeals upheld the verdict, noting that
Louisiana law permits such lawsuits where the company should have
foreseen that, as a result of its actions, the plaintiff would 22incur
7
mental suffering beyond "minimal worry and inconvenience.
In Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company,228 a
computer programmer brought suit after being discharged for refusing to participate in a random drug testing program imposed by the
company.229 Significantly, plaintiff alleged there was no advance notice to employees of the testing program. 2 0 The jury unanimously
decided in favor of Luck on her three claims: wrongful discharge in
violation of California's public policy, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 23' The jury awarded plaintiff nearly $273,000 in punitive
damages, $32,000 for 32emotional distress, and approximately
$180,000 for lost wages.
The California Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's award
of $485,042,233 even though it found that several of the theories of
2 34 In
liability asserted by the plaintiff were without legal support.
particular, the court found that the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged from her job because the discharge was a breach of the covrejected plaintiff's claim
enant of good faith and fair dealing, but
23
policy.
public
violated
discharge
the
that
These cases underscore the importance of providing adequate
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.

227.

Id. at 44.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1990).
267 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
Id. at _
Id.
Id.
Id.

233. Id. at _,
234. Id. at .,
235. Id. at

,

267 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34.
267 Cal. Rptr. at 634-36.,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 633-36.
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written notice prior to implementing a drug testing program, and
minimizing the program's invasiveness upon personal privacy.
D. Wrongful Discharge
1. Based On Public Policy.-A majority of states continue to
adhere to the "traditional" employment at-will rule. Under the rule,
employment for an indefinite term, with or without a contract, can
be terminated by either party at any time, with or without cause.236
However, many states have carved out an exception to the general employment at-will rule based on tortious violations of public
policy, and have applied this exception to discharges for failure or
refusal to take a drug test.23 For example, the New Jersey trial
court in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Company, 38 held that
private at-will employees in New Jersey have a right not to be discharged for reasons contrary to public policy, and found the company's unannounced random drug testing program violated this public policy.23 9 "It is well established that 'an employee has a cause of
action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a
clear mandate of public policy.' ",240 The court held that New Jersey
public policy requiries that drug testing "only be conducted in the
workplace upon a good faith showing of individualized reasonable
suspicion. "241
The court further noted that even if the company's drug testing
program were based on reasonable suspicion, it would violate New
Jersey's public policy because the testing procedures were unreasonable 242 (e.g., without notice or opportunity for rehabilitation, and no
236. Note, Protective At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
237. See infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.
238. No. W-003611-86 (N.J. Super. Ct., Gloucester City April 28, 1989) (LEXIS).
239. Id. at LEXIS 16.
240. Id. at LEXIS 8 (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980).
241. Id. at LEXIS 10.

Defendant [Coastal] is unable to cite any facts or circumstances which even attempt
to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion in plaintiff's case ... There was never
any complaint of suspicion of plaintiff's drug involvement. He had performed his
work without incident. He carried out his duties without impairment and he was

characterized as an above average employee. Coastal having failed to meet the standard, [Mr. Hennessey's] discharge must be viewed as a clear violation of public

policy.
Id. But see Jevic v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 89-4431 (D.C.N.J. 1990) (stating that a
federal district court upheld the company's pre-employment drug testing policy and dismissed

the plaintiff job applicant's claims of invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and violation of
public policy).
242. Id. at LEXIS 12-13.
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opportunity to retest the sample). Therefore, under Hennessey, drug
testing programs in New Jersey must be based upon reasonable suspicion and must utilize reasonable testing procedures.
In the recently decided case of Semore v. Pool,243 the California
Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the privacy interests of an
employee, terminated for refusing to submit to a compelled drug
test, implicate a fundamental public policy. 244 The court noted that
privacy, like the other inalienable rights listed in the California Constitution, is at least as fundamental as antitrust statutes or perjury
wrongful discharge
statutes under which state courts have upheld
245
policy.
public
of
claims based on a violation
2. Based on Implied Contract.-Another exception to an employer's ability to fire at-will employees exists in some states where
an implied contract of employment has been expressed in employee
handbooks or manuals. 246 Consequently, employment policies, handbooks, and supervisory manuals should be reviewed to see whether
they contain any implied assurances of continued employment which
would buttress a wrongful discharge claim. In drafting any substance abuse policy, an employer must be careful not to relinquish
his right to terminate at any time any at-will employee. Disclaimers
of contractual intent should be included in any drug abuse policy.
Even in the absence of implied contractual language in employee handbooks or manuals, a contract may be found to exist between an at-will employee and the employer where the parties act in
such a way as to provide for an implied contract. 47 For example, in
248 the court determined
Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation,
that an implied contract not to terminate the plaintiff except for
good cause existed where: (1) the plaintiff had been employed for
six-and-one-half years; 24 9 (2) the plaintiff had been promoted to a
non-union position after two years of employment;2 50 and (3) the
plaintiff received grade and salary increases and was repeatedly
complimented for her work. 251 The court concluded that these factors created a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff would not be
243.

217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1990). Cf. Luck v. Southern Pacific

Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1990).

244. Semore, 217 Cal. App. 3d at., 266 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
245. Id. at...._, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
246.

See, e.g., Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).

247. See Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d at...._, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
248.

218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1990).

249. Id. at....., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
250.

Id.

251. Id.
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terminated without good cause. 252
VII.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS RELATING TO
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING

A commonly litigated issue in the drug testing arena is whether
an employee who has been discharged for testing positive for illegal
drugs, or who refuses to be tested, is entitled to unemployment compensation. In general, benefits have been denied in cases in which the
court concludes the individual's positive test result, or refusal to submit to a test, constitutes "willful" or "wanton" misconduct so as to
preclude unemployment compensation under the state's worker's
253
compensation statute.
A.

Court Decisions

State courts vary widely in their decisions relating to what constitutes "misconduct". In Overstreet v. Department of Employment
Security,254 an Illinois appellate court held that a bus driver who
tested positive for cocaine during her physical examination disqualified her from unemployment compensation benefits. 255 The court reasoned that the employee's use of cocaine prior to reporting to work
was a deliberate violation of her employer's policy, 256 and constituted
"misconduct," barring her from receiving any benefits under the unemployment compensation statute.257
Similarly, in Fowler v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,' 8
the court held that the sheriff's department could require its employees to submit to a drug test if the request were based on "reasonable
suspicion", and failure to submit is "misconduct" warranting the denial of unemployment compensation benefits.25 9 Contrary to many of
the court decisions on drug testing, the Fowler decision specifically
held that establishment of a written substance abuse policy is not a
prerequisite to conducting a drug test.26 0
[T]he sheriff could legally require Fowler to submit to a urinalysis
test, whether such request was ad hoc or en masse by use of a
252. Id.
253. See infra notes 258-75 and accompanying text.
254. 168 Ill. App. 3d 24, 522 N.E.2d 185 (111.App. Ct. 1988).
255. Id. at., 522 N.E.2d at 187.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 537 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5 Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
259. Id. at 163.
260. Id. at 164 (citing City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 5 Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
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promulgated policy. The existence val non of a policy requiring an
employee to submit to a urinalysis when the employer has a reasonable suspicion of drug use by the employee is not essential. Reasonable suspicion is all that is required.2""
A number of courts have held that an employee cannot be denied unemployment benefits for off-the-job use of drugs unless it is
established that such use affects the employee's work. For example,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that a positive drug test that measures off-duty use does not disqualify an employee from unemployment compensation benefits without proof that the off-duty use actually affected the employee's job performance.2 6 2 The employee tested
positive for marijuana on two separate occasions following on-the-job
accidents.2 6 3 The court noted that the positive test results demonstrate only that the employee was using the drug at some time in the
past.2 6 4 The test did not show whether such use affected his job performance.165 On that basis, the court ruled that, unless the employer
can prove that the employee's use of marijuana adversely affected
the employee's ability and capacity to perform his job duties, the
employee cannot be disqualified from receiving unemployment and
compensation benefits because of misconduct. 66
B.

Unemployment and Workers' Compensation Statutes

In addition to the growing body of case law relating to the issue
of drugs and eligibility for unemployment compensation, a number
of states have enacted unemployment compensation statutes with
specific provisions regulating substance abuse in the workplace. For
example, Louisiana's Employment Security Law2" provides that employees discharged for using illegal drugs are disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.2 68 However, to support disqualifica261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See National Gypsum v. Kansas Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 244 Kan.
678,--, 772 P.2d 786, 793 (1989).
263. Id. at._, 772 P.2d at 788. The employee tested positive for substance abuse on two
occasions: four months after his second on-the-job accident and two days after his third on-thejob accident. Id.
264. Id. aL___, 772 P.2d at 791.
265. Id.
266. Id. at_._, 772 P.2d at 791-92. For similar findings, see Glide Lumber Products v.
Employment Div., 86 Or. App. 669, 741 P.2d 907 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Blake v. Hercules,
Inc., 356 S.E. 2d. 453 (Va. Ct. App. 1987). Each of these cases held that an employee cannot
be denied unemployment benefits for off-the-job use of marijuana which has no impact on the
employee's work. See Section V (D) for a discussion of the "current impairment" controversy.
267. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1471 (West 1985).
268. See generally § 23:1601(3)(a) (West 1985).
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tion for drug use, the employer must prove the employee's use of
drugs by a "preponderance of the evidence," pursuant to a written
and promulgated drug policy.26 9 Discharge of an employee for refusal to submit to a drug test is presumed to be a dismissal for misconduct under the statute. 7
Florida recently amended its worker's compensation statute to
provide for drug testing of private sector employees following a
workplace injury, if the employer has "reason to suspect" the injury
was caused primarily by drugs or alcohol.
VIII.

A.

SPECIAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT
UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES

To

Bargaining Obligations Under The National Labor Relations
Act

Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter
"NLRA") 27 2 requires the union and employer to bargain over
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-

ment. ....

"273

Failure to bargain over a mandatory subject consti-

tutes a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 7 4 Section 8(a)(1)
makes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees ....,,27 Taken together, an employer violates sections 8(a)(5) and (1) if a material change in the conditions of employment is made without consulting with the employee's bargaining
representative and without providing a meaningful opportunity to
bargain.2 76 Accordingly, a private employer who unilaterally implements a drug or alcohol testing program may commit an unfair labor
practice in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA.
1. Job Applicants: Bargaining May Not Be Required.-On
June 15, 1989, the National Labor Relations Board ruled that employers must bargain prior to establishing drug and alcohol testing
programs for current employees, 7 but that bargaining is not re269. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601. The statute also requires a number of procedural
safeguards such as use of confirmatory tests, certified laboratories, chain of custody procedures, and confidentiality of test results. See infra Appendix A.
270. LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(13)(a) (West 1985).
271. See FLA. STAT. § 440.09(6)(a) (1989) (amending § 440.09).
272. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
273. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
274. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1) (1988).
276. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-47 (1962).
277. See Minneapolis Star Tribune, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1567 (1989).
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quired prior to testing job applicants. 7 In Minneapolis Star Tribune, the employer implemented a substance abuse testing program
without bargaining with the workers' guild.27 9 An unfair labor practice charge was filed after a job applicant's offer of employment was
denied because the prospective employee refused to submit to testing.2 0° The Board held that job applicants are not "employees" represented by the union, 28 ' and that an employer's use of testing as
part of his hiring criteria does not so "vitally affect" the working
conditions of current employees as to bring it within the scope of
bargaining under the Act.28 2
2. Current Employees: Bargainingis Required.-In JohnsonBateman Company,"' a new substance abuse program was implemented without consulting the union, whereby any employee who received treatment for injuries on the job would be tested for substance
abuse.28 4 Regarding current employees, the Board held that testing
is a mandatory subject of bargaining because it affects the "'terms
and conditions'" of employment subject to negotiation under section
8(d) of the NLRA. 8 5 The Board also held that the union did not
waive its rights to bargain by agreeing to a broad management
rights clause, or by acquiescing in the employer's earlier testing of
job applicants, without further evidence that the union intended such
a waiver. 2 6 The clause made no specific reference "to any particular
subject areas, much less a specific reference to drug [and] alcohol
testing.12 87 Therefore, it was determined that the management rights
clause did not constitute "an express, clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable waiver by the Union of its statutory right to bargain about
the [Company's] implementation of the instant drug [and] alcohol
testing requirement. '288 Absent such a waiver, unilateral implemen278.

See Johnson-Bateman Co., 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393 (1989).

279.

Minneapolis Star, 131 L.R.R.M. at 1570.

280.
281.

Id.
Id. at 1573.

282. Id. However, a union has a legitimate bargaining interest in ensuring that any job
qualification or requirement is applied in a nonbiased manner. Accordingly, the Board found a
violation in Minneapolis Star Tribune based on the employer's refusal to furnish the union
with requested information relating to the names of applicants subject to testing, and those

denied employment because they refused to be tested, where the information was requested
pursuant to a grievance alleging violations of several contractual provisions, including the nondiscrimination provisions of the agreement. Id.
283.
284.
285.
286.

131 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
Johnson-Bateman, 131
Johnson-Bateman, 131
Johnson-Bateman, 131

1393 (1989).
L.R.R.M. at 1395.
L.R.R.M. at 1396.
L.R.R.M. at 1398.

287. Id. at 1399.
288.

Id.
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tation of a drug/alcohol testing program is an unfair labor practice.
Based on these decisions, it appears that employers (1) will be
obligated to bargain with the union prior to implementation of a
drug testing policy that affects current employees, unless there is evidence of a clear and unequivocal waiver; (2) will not be obligated to
bargain with the union prior to implementing a drug and alcohol
testing program which affects only job applicants; and (3) may be
obligated in certain circumstances to supply the union, upon request,
with information concerning the drug policy for applicants, such as
information on applicants who have submitted or have refused to
submit to the drug tests to ensure the tests are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
3. Federal Regulations vs. The Duty to Bargain.-A question
left unanswered by MinneapolisStar Tribune and Johnson-Bateman
Company28' is what impact, if any, collective bargaining obligations
have upon an employer's ability to implement federally-imposed
drug testing programs fully and in a timely manner. For example, to
what extent do the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter
"DOT") drug testing requirements overrule collective bargaining
agreements?
In general, those aspects of a company's drug testing program
which are specifically required by federal regulations, and which do
not give the employer flexibility or latitude in the implementation of
the requirement, probably are not subject to bargaining. To hold
otherwise would require the employer to bargain away that which is
required by law, and is inconsistent with the purpose of the National
Labor Relations Act and general principles of statutory
interpretation.
In Hanes Corporation, neither the General Counsel nor the
charging party bothered to raise the issue of whether the respondent
was obligated to bargain over that which is mandated by federal regulation. 90 The parties presumably accepted as a given that the respondent is under no such obligation. Consequently, under the Department of Transportation's regulations, decisions such as whether
to implement a drug testing program, which positions will be covered, which drugs will be tested for, and which procedures will be
followed are specifically mandated and are probably not subject to
bargaining.
On the other hand, a company is obligated to bargain with a
289.
290.

See supra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
See Hanes Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 557, 562 (1982).
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union until impasse on the details of its implementation of federal
regulations, and is required to bargain over those elements of the
testing program that are left to its discretion. 29 1 Discretionary aspects of a DOT testing program would include, for example, whether
to provide for rehabilitation, whether to include alcohol in the testing
program, and the extent of disciplinary action, if any, following a
confirmed positive test result.2 92 These issues and others are
mandatory subjects of bargaining and must be brought to the union's
attention prior to implementing a drug testing program.
B. Bargaining Obligations Under The Railway Labor Act
Like the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act (hereinafter
"RLA") 293 prohibits employers from instituting unilateral changes in
agreements afflicting "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. .. .9, In determining whether an employer covered by the

RLA has violated this provision, the RLA distinguishes between
"major" and "minor" disputes.295 In general, if a proposed practice
by a carrier is a clear departure from the collective bargaining
agreement, a dispute over the practice is treated as a "major dispute," and the carrier may proceed unilaterally. 296 If, however, the
proposed practice is arguably justified by the collective bargaining
agreement, then the dispute is "minor," and the carrier may proceed
unilaterally.297
A number of courts have resolved the questions surrounding implementation of drug and alcohol testing policies in the railroad industry by distinguishing between major and minor disputes. In Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association,9 " the Supreme Court held that a railroad's decision to
test employees for drugs during periodic and return-from-leave physical exams is a "minor dispute" under the Railway Labor Act because it is arguably justified by the parties' collective bargaining
291.

See id.; see also EPI Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1172 (1986); Lockheed Shipbuild-

ing and Constr. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 171, 177 (1984).
292. See Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs; Interim Final Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,002 (1988).
293. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988) (governing labor relations in the railroad and airline

industries).
294.

RLA § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).

295. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1986).
296. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives'
U.S...,.

Ass'n, 489

109 S. Ct. 2477, 2480 (1989).

297.

Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 2480-82.

298.

489 U.S.

-,

109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

43

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 8:2

agreement. 99 In this case, Conrail required its employees to undergo
periodic, return-to-duty, and follow-up examinations since 1976.300
In 1984, Conrail implemented a policy that a drug screen would be
involved in all periodic and return-to-duty physicals.30 1 In 1987,
Conrail included drug testing during follow-up examinations as
02
well.3
The Court found that, although the scope of drug testing within
physical examinations has changed over time, drug testing has always played some part in Conrail's medical examinations.30 3 According to the Court, the fact that the union never before had intervened
in the procedural details of Conrail's drug testing provided a con3 04
tractual basis for Conrail's modification of its medical exams.
Therefore, Conrail's unilateral promulgation of the drug testing policy was "arguably justified" under the contract.3 0 5
C. Contract Arbitration
Unions have long challenged drug-free workplace programs in a
variety of ways. There have been many examples of attempts to enjoin the implementation of policies through lawsuits, unfair labor
practice charges, and contract arbitrations. Some have been successful and others have not. Even if the employer's program is accepted,
unions will often arbitrate the validity of discharges based upon drug
or alcohol abuse.
In general, arbitrators have struck down drug and alcohol testing programs where the contract does not clearly define employer
and employee rights regarding the testing programs (e.g., the circumstances under which testing may be required as a condition of
employment, the testing procedures used, and the discipline imposed
for failing or refusing to submit to the test). For example, an employee discharged for refusal to submit to a postaccident drug test
was reinstated where the contract failed to articulate that automatic
postaccident testing may be required as a condition of employment.30 6 Rather, the company's policy merely stated that anyone
"suspected of being under the influence" of drugs or alcohol must
submit to a blood and/or urine test. Since involvement in a vehicular
299. Id. at,
109 S. Ct. at 2485.
300. Id.
301. Id. at., 109 S. Ct. at 2486.
302.

Id.

303. Id. at
304.
305.
306.

,

109 S. Ct. at 2488.

Id.
Id. at
, 109 S. Ct. at 2489.
See, e.g., Tribune Co, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 201 (1989) (Crane, Arb.).
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inaccident doesn't necessarily lead to suspicion of being "under the
307
cause.
for
not
was
discharge
the
found
arbitrator
the
fluence,"
Even where the parties have expressly agreed to drug testing,
discipline may not be sustained if the test is conducted in an unreasonable fashion. For example, in one recent case, an arbitrator held
that while the company could require reasonable-suspicion drug testing, the company did not have just cause to discharge a particular
employee who refused to provide a urine sample while under a
nurse's observation. The employee had worn a leotard and would
have had to disrobe almost completely. The nurse had refused her
request for a robe.308
Others have struck down substance abuse testing programs for
failure to confirm positive test results or failure to implement proper
chain-of-custody procedures. 30 9 These cases further emphasize the
importance of developing a comprehensive substance abuse program
with all of the appropriate procedural safeguards.
Arbitrators frequently uphold mandatory testing based on individualized reasonable suspicion.3 10 However, there is a split among
arbitrators concerning the reasonableness of postaccident testing and
periodic testing of safety-sensitive employees. These cases depend in
large measure on the particular facts, such as the seriousness of the
safety concerns and whether the employer has the right to implement work rules without the union's agreement. Some arbitrators
have held that postaccident testing is not reasonable unless there is
some basis to believe that the accident was caused by the employee's
impaired judgment. 31 Alternatively, automatic postaccident testing
has been upheld in other cases regardless of whether there exists
cause to believe the employee was impaired.312
307. Id.
308. Union Plaza Hotel, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 528 (1986) (McKay, 1986).
309. See, e.g., Day & Zimmerman Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001, 1009 (1987)
(Heinsz, Arb.).
310.

See, e.g., Crescent Metal Prods., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1129 (1989) (Coyne, Arb.).

(upholding discharge of shop steward who refused to submit to unilaterally adopted reasonable
suspicion drug testing); Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority, 84 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1272 (1985) (Statham, Arb.). (upholding unilaterally implemented reasonable suspicion drug testing policy); Springfield Mass Transit District,80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 193 (1983)
(Guenther, Arb.). (upholding breathalizer policy based upon reasonable suspicion and follow-

ing serious accidents by bus drivers).
311.

See, e.g., Tribune Co, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 201 (1989) (Crane, Arb.). (postacci-

dent testing unreasonable where the accident itself is the only basis for suspicion that the
employee was under the influence); Stone ContainerCorp, 91 Lab Arb. (BNA) 1186 (1988)
(Ross, Arb).
312. See, e.g., Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968 (1987) (Wies, Arb.). (upholding discharge of forklift driver who refused to submit to unilaterally implemented postaccident
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As these cases illustrate, arbitration is unpredictable, particularly when it involves controversial issues such as drug testing.
IX.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING A DRUG-FREE
WORKPLACE POLICY AND PROGRAM

A.

Drug-Free Workplace Action List

Developing a successful policy against alcohol and substance
abuse and an overall campaign to achieve a drug-free workplace
must begin at the senior management level and encompass the entire
workforce. To enhance positive employee relations and reduce the
risk of lawsuits, employers should undertake the following actions
prior to implementing a Drug-Free Workplace Policy:
1. Review and analyze federal contract and grant obligations, if
any, to determine whether your company is subject to the DrugFree Workplace Act, or the Department of Defense's interim drugfree workforce rule. If you have federal contracts or grants, or if
you are subject to the Department of Transportation's or Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's drug testing regulations, you may be required to implement a substance abuse policy.
2. Examine all of the relevant federal and state law restrictions
applicable to your company (e.g., federal and state constitutional
requirements, fair employment laws, specific state drug testing
statutes, common law remedies, and collective bargaining
obligations).
3. Develop a written substance abuse policy and procedures for implementation in accordance with all relevant federal, state and local laws.
4. In preparing the policy, a preliminary determination should be
made as to whether drug and/or alcohol testing should or must be
included in your program. If testing is not required by law, employers must carefully balance the advantages of implementing a testing program against the costs associated with potential legal liabilities arising from the test. In some cases, education and
rehabilitation are preferable alternatives to the time, expenses and
trouble of drug testing. On the other hand, testing can in many
instances minimize drug-related problems in the workplace by providing useful information in detecting substance abuse before it is
too late.
drug testing); Concrete Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.).
(upholding discharge of tractor-trailer driver who refused to submit to unilaterally implemented postaccident drug testing). See also FlemingFoods, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1292 (1987)
(Yarowsky, Arb.) (upholding unilaterally implemented drug testing of drivers during periodic
physical examinations).
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5. Determine the scope of the testing program's coverage, which
employees or applicants will be tested, and the circumstances under
which testing will be conducted. These decisions should be based on
the particular needs of the company and the legal risks attendant
to the particular testing program. In general, pre-employment, reasonable cause, periodic, and post-accident testing for safety-sensitive or critical positions are less vulnerable to legal challenges than
unannounced random or "across-the-board" testing programs
which do not consider whether freedom from drug or alcohol abuse
is a bona-fide occupational qualification.
6. Consider issues such as: the extent of disciplinary penalties, if
any, for violations of the policy; circumstances under which
mandatory participation in rehabilitation or drug assistance programs should be imposed following policy violations; the extent to
which the company should retain the right to randomly inspect
company issued lockers, desks, cabinets, etc. for drugs or drug paraphernalia; and whether the company should reserve the right to
conduct a search of personal bags, packages, etc.
7. Develop rules to cover off-premises conduct. In general, offpremises activities which do not affect job performance, the employee's own or others' safety at work, or the employer's reputation
are vulnerable to privacy claims.
8. Train supervisors who are responsible for enforcing the program
in understanding the policy and the procedures for its implementation. Whenever feasible, collection of samples for testing, chain of
custody, and other testing procedures should be performed by a
properly certified laboratory.
9. Distribute the written policy to applicants and employees who
are subject to the policy. This should be done (and is required
under many federal and state laws) prior to any drug testing or
searches. Additional channels of communication may be utilized
such as bulletin board postings and video tapes to inform employees of the policy. General release forms, consent forms, and other
forms should accompany the policy.
10. Where testing is performed, establish an employee file to indicate the employee's name, the date, location and result of the test,
the lab performing the test, and any other relevant information
pertaining to the test. These files generally should be kept separate
from other employee files and in all cases must be kept extremely
confidential.
11. Key management personnel and counsel should determine
whether and to what extent such policies would impact upon collective bargaining obligations. In unionized companies, bargaining
with the employees' representative will be required in many cases,
and counsel should review the labor relations climate, the contract,
collective bargaining history and other factors relevant to bargain-
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ing proposals or strategies.
12. Key personnel and counsel should review the substance abuse
policy, and the employee relations and communication strategy for
implementation.
13. Review all existing employment policies, handbooks, supervisory manuals, practices or collective bargaining agreements to determine whether they are consistent with the new substance abuse
program.
14. Written*indemnification should be obtained from the laboratory, and any other party responsible for drug testing or collection
of samples, to protect the employer from liabilities arising from implementation of the testing program.
B.

What To Include In a Drug And Alcohol Testing Policy

Substance abuse testing policies should, at a minimum, incorpo-

31
rate the following provisions: G

1. A statement explaining the company's philosophy;
2. A section defining certain terms, such as "controlled substances," "illegal drugs," "reasonable cause," and any other terms
having a specialized or technical meaning;
3. The standards of conduct that employees are expected to meet;
4. A policy statement defining the methods of detection to be used
by the company and the circumstances under which the methods
will be used. This includes an explanation of the testing methods to
be used and when tests will be required (e.g., during a physical
examination or when there is reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use);
5. A statement explaining the consequences of testing positive for
drug or alcohol use. This should include disciplinary action, as well
as any rehabilitation alternatives to discipline;
6. A statement informing applicants and employees that consent
forms, general release forms, and other forms must be signed as a
condition of employment and continued employment;
7. Procedural safeguards such as confirmatory tests, preservation
of specimens, chain-of-custody techniques, confidentiality of test results, and use of qualified labs; and
8. A statement providing notice of the circumstances under which
searches of company and personal property may be conducted.
313. For a comprehensive discussion of what to include in a Substance Abuse Policy, see
M. F. PAYSON and P. B. ROSEN, Substance Abuse: A Crisis in the Workplace, TRIAL, July,
1987. See also Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs; Final Rule
and Notice of Conference, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,854 (1989) (outlining the DOT's drug testing
procedures).
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In addition, testing policies must be tailored to meet the specific
requirements of all applicable federal, state and local laws, as well as
relevant court rulings.
X.

CONCLUSION

Substance abuse is a serious problem in the workplace, and a
growing number of employers are relying on drug testing as the
means of dealing with the problem. The federal government has
mandated drug testing in several safety-sensitive industries and may
adopt other measures to fight its "war on drugs."
However, while drug testing may be a useful device for maximizing job safety, productivity, and worker morale, testing programs
that are conducted in an abusive or irresponsible manner may lead
to lawsuits based on a variety of legal theories. To safeguard against
these potential abuses and the liability that might arise therefrom,
employers who test for drugs or alcohol should: (1) become familiar
with any federal, state or local laws (see chart); (2) avoid drug testing programs which have a discriminatory impact on protected minority groups in violation of Title VII or in violation of human rights
or handicap laws; (3) avoid unilateral implementation of drug testing
programs which constitute significant changes in working conditions
or terms of employment in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act or the Railway Labor Act; (4) use reliable testing procedures to
ensure accountability and integrity of specimens, and require confirmation of all positive screening tests; (5) maintain strict confidence
regarding all employee's drug or alcohol use and implement testing
procedures which minimize any impact upon individual privacy; and
(6) help employees to overcome their problem by providing rehabilitation or employee assistance programs.
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